In this paper, I discuss the issue of how non-financial corporations should report the results of their use of derivative financial instruments. Using the recently issued SFAS 133 as a framework, I
Introduction
In recent years, the corporate use of derivative financial instruments such as forwards, futures, options and swaps has been subject to rapid growth, both in terms of the extent of use and the complexity of the instruments employed. For example, a recent Bank for International Settlements (BIS) survey showed that of the estimated US$ 74 trillion (in notional value terms) of over the counter interest rate and foreign exchange derivatives outstanding in December 1999, approximately 11% (US$ 8 trillion) were held by non-financial users. Similarly, in the Group of Thirty report published in March 1994, over 80% of private sector corporations were reported as considering that derivatives were important in implementing their financial policies. To illustrate the increased complexity in the types of derivatives being used by corporations, one need look no further than the well publicized losses incurred by Proctor and Gamble on leveraged swap transactions.
Almost inevitably, this rapid growth in the use of the derivatives markets by corporate end-users has not been matched by corresponding developments in the "financial infrastructure -that is, the institutional interfaces between intermediaries and financial markets, regulatory practices, organization of trading, clearing, back-office facilities and management-information systems" (Merton (1996) ). One important element of the infrastructure for which this is unquestionably the case is the financial reporting environment. Accounting and disclosure requirements 1 in respect of the use of derivatives by non-financial corporations have been until lately at best piecemeal, internally inconsistent, non-uniform across various types of derivatives and incomplete (for example, the US) and at worst effectively non-existent (for example, the UK). Further, the large derivatives-related losses experienced by companies such as Gibsons Greetings, Metallgesellschaft and Proctor and Gamble led to the derivatives industry coming under intense scrutiny from the media, regulators and politicians alike. As described by Benston and Mian (1995) , much of the debate surrounding these incidents focused on the use of derivatives for what were apparently speculative purposes and the inadequacy of the then current reporting requirements for 1 As a matter of terminology, I classify a particular requirement as "accounting" if it relates to the determination of the amounts which are included in the income statement and/or balance sheet and as "disclosure" if it relates to the more detailed information typically presented in the supplementary notes to the financial statements. Although I draw this distinction between accounting and disclosure requirements, my philosophy is that the value-relevance of a footnote disclosure (e.g. the fair value of the company's derivatives portfolio at the year-end) is identical to that of the same information included in the balance sheet or income statement unless the fact that the information is/is not included in a primary financial statement by itself has informational content. In other words, I adopt (at least as a starting point) the somewhat "purist" view that investors analyse the financial statements in their entirety, rather than simply focusing on a subset of the statements.
communicating this information to shareholders, regulators and other interested parties.
Consequently, regulatory bodies such as the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) in the US and the Accounting Standards Board (ASB) in the UK came under increased pressure to make the development of a comprehensive and consistent set of rules for the reporting of corporate derivatives usage a matter of some priority.
Whilst few disagreed that these reporting requirements were in need of a major overhaul, the level of consensus regarding the solution to the problem was considerably lower. From anecdotal evidence, it is clear that the presentation of information relating to derivative securities in financial statements is an issue of some concern to corporate users and that risk management strategies are actually set with full consideration of the implications of these strategies for the financial reporting process. For example:
• in a survey of 350 firms conducted in October 1995 (Bodnar, Hayt and Marston (1996) ), "qualifying for hedge accounting" 2 was identified by 30% of those respondents using derivatives as an issue over which the degree of concern was "high" -interestingly, only 9%
had a high degree of concern over disclosure requirements 3
• a similar survey of 399 firms conducted in October 1997 (Bodnar, Hayt and Marston (1998)) saw 74% of respondents claim that they has a "high or moderate degree of concern" regarding the accounting treatment of their derivatives activity
• when announcing in late 1994 that it had unwound derivatives with a total notional value of $6 billion, Kodak explained the decision as an attempt to prevent volatility in earnings as a result of using derivatives; at around the same time, RJR Nabisco announced that it was discontinuing its use of derivatives that were subject to mark to market accounting
• the FASB received over 250 responses to the Exposure Draft which preceded SFAS 133:
Accounting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities, the recently issued standard that is intended to unify the accounting and disclosure requirements in this area -the contents of the Exposure Draft and the nature of these responses are considered in detail later in the paper.
It is therefore apparent that these requirements are an important factor in determining whether a non-financial corporation will choose to hedge the risks to which it is exposed and if so, which risks should be hedged and which derivative instruments should be used to effect this hedging and also whether derivatives should be used for speculative purposes. For example, Montesi and Lucas (1996) note: "Derivatives are powerful and useful risk management tools, and the inadequacy of financial reporting may discourage their legitimate use by contributing to an atmosphere of uncertainty." Similarly, Benston and Mian (1995) assert that "our analysis of financial statements indicates that these rules have significantly constrained firms from using derivatives optimally."
In other words, the financial reporting environment is not economically "neutral" but in many cases will be a significant economic variable in the corporation's decision making process. Consequently, any proposed solution must take full account of these economic implications. Whilst certainly necessary, it is not sufficient that reporting requirements for derivatives be comprehensive and consistent -they must also be designed so as to discourage sub-optimal risk management policies 4 .
At this point, it is worthwhile commenting on the terminology used in this paper. Within the existing literature, the terms "hedging" and "risk management" are used somewhat interchangeably.
In this paper, I will use "risk management" to refer to any use of derivative instruments for whatever purpose. In practice, corporations have alternative means of effecting risk management strategies. For example, the exchange rate risk resulting from income denominated in a foreign currency may be reduced by choosing a capital structure which includes financing in that currency.
Because of the focus of this paper, I will ignore this issue and will concentrate solely on corporate risk management via the use of derivatives. The term "hedging" will be reserved for those situations where such instruments are used by a corporation to reduce its exposure to a particular risk factor, whilst "speculation" will be used to signify the use of derivatives to increase the corporation's level of exposure to some risk factor.
To illustrate the importance of this distinction and to create a feel for the inherent problems faced by the standard setters, consider the case of an oil producer which sells forward 70% of its total production volume. This may be considered simply as a partial hedge. Alternatively, it may be instructive to decompose the position into a full hedge (selling forward of all production) partially offset by a speculative position involving forward purchases amounting to 30% of production volume. The reason why such a breakdown may be useful is that the motivation for the two components may be significantly different. For example, market frictions such as bankruptcy costs or taxes (see Section 3 below) may create a value for hedging such that the fully hedged position is the optimal "passive" response; in addition, the company may have an informational advantage concerning the future path of oil prices which it chooses to exploit by taking a speculative position in the forward market. This dual motivation for risk management is consistent both with the observation that many companies who utilize derivatives do not necessarily adopt a fully hedged position and with (again anecdotal) evidence that a corporate's risk management policies may well include an element which essentially amounts to "taking a view" on the market. For example, in a survey of Fortune 500 companies carried out in 1992 (Dolde (1993) ), only slightly more than 10% of companies using derivatives claimed never to use them for taking a view 5 .
In this paper, I address the general issue of how the accounting and disclosure rules relating to the corporate use of derivative financial instruments can actually affect the way in which companies choose to use such instruments. The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, I firstly describe the two main systems of accounting for derivatives, namely hedge accounting and mark to market accounting. I then review the key elements of the recently issued SFAS 133: Accounting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities (I choose to base my discussion on the US simply because this is the jurisdiction in which the current rules are the most developed and also because standard setting bodies in other jurisdictions, in particular the UK, are likely to pay significant attention to the US requirements when developing their own standards) 6 . Finally, I consider the responses to the Exposure Draft which preceded the standard in order to delineate the issues which are of concern to derivatives end-users. The aim here is to identify within the somewhat detailed requirements those factors which are of prime importance to corporates when determining risk management policies.
5 Stulz (1996) argues that "the primary goal of risk management is to eliminate the probability of costly lower-tail outcomes" and that certain companies may have informational advantages which encourage selective hedging. 6 In September 1998, the ASB issued FRS 13 -"Derivatives and Other Financial Instruments: Disclosures" in which they note that "work on measurement and hedge accounting is therefore continuing and the Board expects to publish proposals on these subjects in due course."
In Section 3, I briefly review the existing literature on possible economic rationales for corporate risk management; I also discuss in somewhat more detail previous work which has examined the interaction between the financial reporting environment and risk management. Since the distinction between hedge and mark to market accounting is crucial to the rest of the paper, it is important at this stage that I define exactly what I mean by these terms. Essentially, hedge accounting refers to a method of accounting for derivative instruments whereby any gains or losses on a particular instrument are only recognized in the income statement when the corresponding losses or gains on the item being hedged are recognized. The basic idea underlying this method of accounting is that the hedged item and the hedge together form an economic "package" and that it is this package which should be accounted for, not the two individual elements.
Based on this underlying principle, there are three basic variants of hedge accounting:
• the fair value of the derivative is recorded on the balance sheet as an asset or liability and any unrealized gains or losses which result are recorded in the income statement immediately. This would only be appropriate if unrealized gains or losses on the item being hedged are accounted for in this way; an example would be the case of a marketable security held for trading purposes
• the fair value of the derivative is recorded on the balance sheet as an asset or liability and any gains or losses are recorded as either a standalone balance sheet item, an adjustment to the balance sheet value of the item being hedged or as elements of comprehensive income (in the UK, this latter treatment would correspond to gains or losses being recorded as movements in reserves and disclosed in the Statement of Total Recognized Gains or Losses). This would be the appropriate treatment for a derivative which is being used to hedge an existing asset or liability which is recorded on the balance sheet but for which gains or losses are only recognized in income when realized
• no accounting entries are made in respect of the derivative until some time after the position is established -in other words, the derivative is treated as an off balance sheet item until this time.
This might be the case, for example, if the derivative were a forward which was being used to hedge against the currency exposure arising from the foreign purchase of a fixed asset -in this situation, the asset and liability are not recorded until the contract is "completed" and the concept of matching would require the hedge to be treated in the same way.
In contrast, under mark to market accounting the fair value of the derivative is recorded on the balance sheet as an asset or liability and any unrealized gains or losses which result are recorded in the income statement immediately, irrespective of the accounting treatment afforded the item (if any) being hedged.
The focus in this paper is on the informational content of the various reporting regimes encountered in practice. In this respect, it is important to note that the second variant of hedge accounting discussed above is informationally equivalent to mark to market accounting (as indeed is the third variant if the unrecognized gain or loss is reported via a footnote disclosure). Consequently, in the theoretical model developed in Section 4, I adopt a slightly different terminology:
• mark to market accounting refers to a system whereby the gain or loss on any derivatives position is recognized immediately whereas that on the hedged item (if any) is recognized only when realized
• under mark to market hedge accounting, gains and losses on both any underlying exposure and the derivative are recognized immediately
• with deferral hedge accounting, any gain or loss on the derivative position is deferred until realized to the extent that it is offset by a corresponding unrecognized loss or gain on an underlying position -to the extent that there is no such offset, the derivative gain or loss is recognized immediately.
SFAS 133 Requirements
In June 1998, the FASB released SFAS 133 -"Accounting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging
Activities" which represented the culmination of a six year program on the part of the board to unify the reporting requirements in this area. In the Standard, four fundamental decisions made by the FASB when formulating the proposals are described. These are as follows:
• derivatives are assets and liabilities and should be reported in the financial statements
• fair value is the most relevant measure for financial instruments and the only relevant measure for derivative financial instruments; derivatives should be measured at fair value and adjustments to the carrying amounts of hedged items should reflect changes in their fair values (that is, gains and losses) arising while the hedge is in effect
• only items that are assets or liabilities should be reported as such in the financial statements
• hedge accounting should be provided for only qualifying transactions, and one aspect of qualification should be an assessment of hedge effectiveness.
The key features of these proposals are that hedge accounting is again being restricted to situations where certain criteria are met, all derivative positions must be included on the balance sheet and any gains or losses must be reported in either earnings or other comprehensive income (a separate component of equity outside of earnings) 7 -they cannot be carried on the balance sheet as standalone "deferred" gains or losses or used to adjust the carrying value of the hedged item 8 . If a gain or loss is initially reported in comprehensive income, it must at some later date be transferred to earnings.
Response to Exposure Draft 9
Overall, the response to the exposure draft preceding SFAS 133 from industrial firms was extremely negative (whilst many changes were made in the final standard, the key requirements are essentially unchanged and so these responses are equally relevant in the context of the standard itself). 61% of respondents disagreed with the exposure draft's proposals whilst 24% agreed with the proposals subject to significant changes being made (the response from financial firms was roughly similar whilst for the professional accounting firms, 37% disagreed and 37% agreed subject to significant changes). Much of the criticism related to specific features of the proposed standard (for example, the prohibition of basis adjustments on forecast transactions) which, although of interest, are somewhat too detailed to be incorporated into a theoretical model of the reporting process.
The response that I shall focus on and which is (with suitable interpretation) amenable to inclusion within such a model relates to the impact of the proposals on volatility. 44% of respondents mentioned increased balance sheet volatility and 62% earnings volatility as a source of potential concern. As an example:
"Given the focus on earnings by analysts and shareholders, the earnings volatility potential presented by fair value hedge accounting, as proposed, may have a material impact on market valuation as well" (Providian Bancorp).
The crux of the argument appears to be that this increased volatility will make the firm appear riskier than it really is. At first glance, such a response appears a little naive; given adequate disclosure, investors will be able to "strip out" the source of this volatility which should therefore have no value relevance. Suppose however that what this response is actually trying to convey is a concern that the proposed standard will not enable firms that are using derivatives for legitimate hedging purposes to properly distinguish themselves from firms which are using them for speculative purposes. If this is the case, then increased volatility in earnings and/or the balance sheet may be genuine (in the case of speculators) or spurious (in the case of hedgers) -if investors are unable to identify into which category a particular firm falls, then this volatility may indeed be value relevant. I will use this as the basic idea behind the theoretical model developed in Section 4.
Literature Review
In this section, I first present a brief review of the existing theoretical literature which addresses the motivations for non-financial corporations to engage in risk management activities. I then discuss in somewhat more detail prior research on the impact of accounting and disclosure requirements on such activities.
Motivations For Corporate Risk Management
In a Modigliani and Miller (1958) world of perfect capital markets (no taxes, no bankruptcy costs, no asymmetric information), any corporate risk management is irrelevant. Consequently, the various economic rationales which have been advanced in an attempt to explain corporate hedging all depend on the violation of one or more of the restrictive conditions required for this irrelevance proposition to be valid.
For example, Smith and Stulz (1985) note that hedging may lead to a reduction in expected tax payments and/or expected bankruptcy costs whilst Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993) use the costs of external financing compared to internally generated funds as a motivation for corporate hedging.
A somewhat different explanation is that of DeMarzo and Duffie (1991) who analyze a setting where firms have proprietary information concerning their exposure to risk and where hedging against these risks enables risk averse investors to make better portfolio choice decisions. In Ljungqvist (1994), proprietary information is also the driving force behind corporate risk management policies although in this case derivatives are used purely for speculative purposes; such (costless) speculation acts as a "signal-jamming" mechanism which allows existing shareholders to manipulate share prices to the detriment of potential new investors. Degeorge, Moselle and Zeckhauser (1996) also use asymmetric information and the desire to influence potential investors' perceptions concerning firm quality to explain corporate risk management policies.
The papers discussed in the previous paragraph all have the maximization of (existing) shareholder value as the firm's objective. By contrast, a number of papers have used managerial utility maximization as the driving force behind corporate risk management policies. For example, Stulz (1984) considers the case of a risk averse manager who also has an equity stake in the firm that is somewhat larger then the optimal level suggested by modern portfolio theory -particularly when human capital is taken into account, the manager is seen to have a very poorly diversified portfolio.
Earlier papers which adopt essentially the same line of reasoning include Holthausen (1979) and Danthine (1980, 1981) . Campbell and Kracaw (1987) note that as a result of the wellknown agency problem between managers and shareholders, risk sharing is sub-optimal. Hedging will reduce the unsystematic risks faced by the firm, risks which are borne disproportionately by managers, and so shareholders may then actually benefit from hedging since this risk reduction induces managers to be more productive. A second paper in a similar spirit is DeMarzo and Duffie (1992). In Breeden and Viswanathan (1996) , it is a concern with communicating managerial ability to the labor market that is the motivation behind corporate risk management programs. They analyze an economy where compensation contracts are renegotiated at the start of each period with the compensation for any period being a fixed amount which is equal to the expected profit for that period conditional on realized profits in previous periods. These profits are comprised of two elements, the first of which is a function of managerial ability and is thus in some sense under the control of the manager, whereas the second is independent of ability and cannot be controlled.
However, hedging instruments are available which allow managers to eliminate the "noise" in profits caused by the uncontrollable factor. Two other papers which also focus on managerial career concerns as the explanation for risk management are DeMarzo and Duffie (1995) and Raposo (1996) -since these papers also consider the impact of accounting and disclosure requirements, they are discussed in the subsection below.
Impact of Financial Reporting Environment
To date, relatively little research has focused on the impact of the financial reporting environment on the risk management activities of firms. Of this research, the two papers which are closest in spirit to the current paper are Melumad, Weyns and Ziv (1999) (hereafter MZW) and its (unpublished) predecessor, Weyns (1993) .
The setting in MZW is of a two-period economy with a single firm with assets in place at 0 = t which generate at 2 = t a random operating cash flow ( )
where x is the firm's exposure to the underlying risk factor, µ is the level of this risk factor at 0 = t and 2 1 ,ε ε are the innovations to the risk factor in the first and second periods respectively.
where 0
x is common knowledge whilst 1 x may be private information at 1 = t ; x (and therefore 1 x )
is publicly observed at 2 = t .
In this economy, all investors have mean-variance utility functions (so that the benefit from hedging at the corporate level is the reduction in the variance of the payoffs to investors) and managers are able to enter into forward contracts, the payoffs from which are perfectly correlated with Y . As expected, when all shareholders are long-term (i.e. will hold their shares until 2 = t and are therefore interested only in the final (net) cash flow), the optimal hedging policy is to hedge the . By doing so, a type-H firm is able to probabilistically separate itself from the type-I firms -by underhedging, the type-H firm will generate first period earnings which are less likely to have originated from a type-I firm. The optimal degree of underhedging will represent a trade-off of the interests of the long-term and the short-term shareholders -once again, any underhedging will be eliminated in a mark to market hedge accounting regime and the distortions could be easily eliminated by allowing voluntary disclosure (in this case of the actual position in forward contracts).
Although Weyns notes that "imperfectly hedging" firms may be explained by (for example) an inability to correctly estimate the true risk exposure or speculative motives arising from heterogeneous beliefs concerning the evolution of the risk factor, he does not attempt to endogenize the actions of the type-I firms. By contrast, the model presented in Section 4 of this paper (which 10 In this variant of the model, any deviation from optimal hedging is motivated solely by a desire to influence investors' beliefs (and therefore the share price) at 1 = t ; consequently, any such deviations are corrected in the second period. 11 It seems intuitively obvious that overhedging in the first period would be the optimal response if the type-I firms were to non-strategically underhedge. also analyzes hedging distortions arising from an inability on the part of investors to distinguish between two types of firm) does explicitly endogenize the behavior of each type as the rational response to the actions of the other.
By contrast, Fischer (1997) considers corporate hedging as a means of eliminating the variability in accounting earnings which arise from factors that are beyond a manager's control and analyzes whether such hedging leads to an improvement in the incentive effects of contracts which are written on these earnings. Within a standard principal-agent framework with a risk-neutral principal and a risk-averse agent, he finds that when the effects of uncontrollable events can be perfectly hedged, perfect hedging should be undertaken and the optimal earnings number for contracting purposes is one derived under "symmetric" accounting 12 . The paper then goes on to analyze a setting in which pre-hedged earnings depend both directly and indirectly on a hedgeable risk factor.
The author finds that the optimal strategy is to hedge the overall (i.e. direct plus indirect) exposure and that this choice of optimal hedge is actually independent of the accounting regime.
Jorgensen (1998) also analyzes the interaction of corporate hedging decisions and the financial reporting environment using a two-period principal-agent model. In this paper, a group of riskaverse shareholders hire a similarly risk-averse manager to acquire (at a cost to the manager) information concerning the correlation between the firm's second period operating income and the gains or losses on a forward contract which must be initiated at 0 = t 13 . As in Fischer (1997) ,
accounting earnings in this model are of importance since they are used for contracting purposes.
Consequently, deferral hedge accounting (earnings in the first period reflect only that period's operating income, not the unrealized gain or loss on the forward position) is distinguishable from mark to market accounting (earnings in the first period reflect both that period's operating income and the unrealized gain or loss on the forward position) -this compares to the situation in Weyns (1993) where, as discussed above, the importance of an earnings number derives from its informational content and these two regimes are essentially equivalent. However, in the Jorgensen model, mark to market hedge accounting and mark to market accounting are identical since the underlying risk exposure which is being hedged affects only the second period operating income; therefore, the first period change in the value of this underlying exposure is, by definition, zero.
12 Using the terminology of this paper, symmetric accounting may be identified with deferral hedge accounting i.e. the earnings number used for contracting includes neither the change in value of the underlying exposure nor the change in value of the hedge position. 13 i.e. in order to hedge the risk inherent in the second period operating income, the manager must establish and maintain a position in the forward contract at 0 = t .
Within this setting, Jorgensen finds similar results to Fischer (1997) i.e. that if performance measures are generated using deferral hedge accounting, there are no hedging distortions, but that such distortions may occur if mark to market accounting is used to determine accounting earnings.
Jorgensen also investigates the demand for separate disclosures of operating income and hedging gains or losses in the context of a single period model with risk-neutral shareholders and a riskaverse manager. He finds that, given linear compensation contracts, the shareholders have no demand for such separate disclosures but that this may not be the case if the manager has private information regarding the hedge instrument.
Two other papers which consider how hedging and its reporting are interrelated (DeMarzo and
Duffie (1995) and Raposo (1996) ) also focus on this somewhat narrower issue of the demand for a split of total accounting earnings between operating and hedging activities. DeMarzo and Duffie (1995) (a paper which is similar to Breeden and Viswanathan (1996) in that the motivation for corporate hedging stems from managerial career concerns) focus directly on the informational role of hedging. They find that with disclosure only of aggregate accounting earnings, managers will always choose a policy of full hedging. However, if separate disclosure of the two components of earnings is mandated, this is no longer the case and indeed no hedging may occur in equilibrium.
Moreover, they show that, by eliminating extraneous noise, hedging improves the informativeness of earnings as an indicator of management ability and project quality and thereby enables shareholders to make better future investment decisions. This increase in the informativeness of earnings may well outweigh the informational content of a separate disclosure of the results of hedging activity, leading shareholders to prefer a regime where only aggregate disclosure is mandated. Raposo (1996) is essentially an extension of DeMarzo and Duffie (1995) which allows for, inter alia, renegotiation of managerial compensation contracts, managerial input into project choice and voluntary disclosure. Once more, the model characterizes the possible accounting regimes as aggregate or separate disclosure of operating and hedging profits and, as such, is less relevant to the model in the current paper than those of MZW, Weyns (1993) , Fischer (1997) and the two-period model of Jorgensen (1998) . Introduction
In this section, I develop a simple economic model with which to analyze the effect on corporate risk management policies of various accounting regimes. Specifically, I consider an economy in which there are two distinct types of firm, namely "high" and "low" quality. A high quality firm has a (risky) terminal operating cash flow that can be decomposed into a firm-specific element (which cannot be hedged) and a market-wide or systematic element (which can be hedged); by contrast, the terminal operating cash flow of a low quality firm is entirely firm-specific. All investors are riskaverse. Consequently, a high quality firm has an incentive to access the derivatives market in order to hedge its systematic risk, whereas a low quality firm has an incentive to avoid this market -it is not exposed to systematic risk and so any use of the derivatives market will lead to an increase in risk which is harmful to its shareholders.
Suppose, however, that shareholders are interested not only in the terminal cash flow of a firm but also in its share price at some intermediate date. If the accounting regime is such that investors are unable to distinguish between the two types of firm, it may make sense for a low quality firm to use the derivatives market for speculation. This will be the case if the higher share price which results from being "pooled" with the high quality firms at the intermediate date outweighs the adverse effect of the increase in risk. Obviously, such pooling will be detrimental to the high quality firms who may therefore attempt to "separate" themselves by choosing a derivatives position that the low quality firms have no incentive to copy. This will be the case if the gain from not being pooled with the low quality firms exceeds the loss from having to choose a sub-optimal hedging strategy. In either case, the accounting regime has a direct impact on corporate risk management policies.
Basic set-up
As described above, the economy under consideration consists of a large number N of firms, of which a proportion θ are of type H and a proportion θ − I shall impose this latter inequality as a parametric restriction in order that the interpretation of H and L as "high" and "low" quality respectively is somewhat meaningful.
Henceforth, I shall assume that each of the firms under consideration is owned by a single shareholder. Whilst somewhat unrealistic, this assumption simplifies the analysis considerably and will not affect the qualitative implications of the model. I also assume (as in Miller and Rock (1985) and numerous studies since) that the existing shareholder in firm i ( 
Assuming the absence of any moral hazard issues, this is the objective function that the manager of firm i will maximize at 0 = t .
Now consider the question of the proceeds the shareholder would receive from selling her holding at 1 = t . Suppose that a fraction π of the firm is offered to a potential new investor. Based on his information, this investor will have a conditional probability distribution over the terminal cash flow M of the firm. The conditional expected utility from a purchase of this fraction is
Consequently, the price ( ) π P at which, assuming for simplicity a risk-free interest rate of zero, the investor is indifferent between this investment and one in risk-free securities (which would generate expected utility of ( ) ( )
which is obviously a function of π . As an immediate corollary of this observation, the total proceeds from a sale of the firm depend crucially on the number of new investors to which the shares are sold and the fraction of the firm which each of them receives. This raises interesting but 14 An alternative formulation is one in which the single shareholder of firm i will, with probability one, sell a fraction i λ − 1 of the firm at 1 = t and retain the remaining fraction
. This formulation is less tractable than the one developed here although I would expect it to generate (at least qualitatively) similar results. Similar remarks apply to a second alternative formulation whereby firm i is owned by multiple shareholders, a fraction i λ − 1 of which are "shortterm" and will sell their shares at 1 = t whilst the remaining fraction i λ are "long-term" and will retain their shares until 2 = t .
(for the purposes of this analysis at least) irrelevant side issues such as optimum trade sizes and the strategic interactions between the various agents; consequently, I make a further simplifying assumption that any sale of shares is made to a single new investor. I also assume that there are a large number of competitive potential investors who will bid away any increase in utility. In summary, therefore, with probability 15 Henceforth, the subscript 1 will be used to denote expectations and variances evaluated conditional on the information available to the new shareholder at 1 = t . The use of an operator without a subscript indicates that this is an unconditional operator evaluated at 0
Accounting Disclosures
Now consider the information available to investors at 1 = t under each of the three accounting regimes i.e. mark to market hedge, deferral hedge and mark to market. In all cases, I assume that disclosure of the derivatives position is required.
Under mark to market hedge accounting, the gain or loss on the forward contract and the gain or loss on the underlying position (if any) are both recognized in earnings i.e. has a support equal to the entire real line means that investors will be unable to distinguish between the two firms. If, however, firm H does report separately the two components of its operating earnings, investors are able to make this distinction, even if L H φ φ = ; for the remainder of the analysis, I shall assume that this is the case. This assumption is critical to my results and I shall discuss it in more detail at the end of the section. Now recall that under a deferral hedge accounting regime, any gain or loss on the forward contract is deferred until realized to the extent that it is offset by a corresponding unrecognised loss or gain on an underlying position -to the extent that there is no such offset, the forward contract gain or loss is recognized immediately. In this case, reported earnings are
However, under the assumption that firm H is also required to disclose that it has deferred the gain or loss on the forward contract, investors will be again be able to distinguish between the two firms even if
Finally, under mark to market accounting, the gain or loss on the forward contract is recognized immediately whereas that on the hedged item (if any) is recognized only when realized. Thus 
with respect to i φ and setting the resulting expression to zero immediately yields the above result. This should be intuitively obvious: entering into a forward contract affects only the variance of the terminal cash flow, not the mean and so the optimum position is that which minimizes this variance. For firm H , this amounts to choosing a position which is equal and opposite to its underlying exposure; for firm L , any position will serve to increase the variance and so the optimum position is zero.
Optimal Risk Management: Case II
Now consider the case where, in addition to the terminal cash flow, the ex-ante utility of the existing shareholder of firm i is also impacted by its market value 
Similarly, for firm L , the conditional distribution of the terminal cash flow is In a mark to market hedge or deferral hedge accounting regime, there are no hedging distortions.
Proof:
This follows immediately from the above discussion given that under a mark to market hedge or a deferral hedge accounting regime, firm H is required to disclose information which enables investors to distinguish between the two firms.
The intuition behind this result should be obvious. The only incentive for firm L to deviate from its optimum position is so that it can be pooled with firm H -the requirement to separately disclose either the two components of operating earnings or the deferral of the hedge gain or loss means that such pooling will not occur and firm L will not wish to deviate. Since the only incentive for firm H to deviate is to separate itself from firm L , firm H will also not wish to deviate from its optimum position.
Suppose, however, that firm type is not public information at 1 = t ; i.e., the market is unable to make the distinction between the two firms -this will be the case under a mark to market accounting regime. In this case, both firms will have the same market value P at 1 = t . In order to calculate what this market value is, I need to again impose the condition that a potential new investor is indifferent between an investment in the firm and an investment in the risk free asset.
Let Z denote the terminal cash flow accruing to this investor. Then, from the investor's perspective,
with probability q and L Z Z = with probability q − 1 where
is the conditional probability that the firm is of type H given that the existing shareholder is selling.
Thus the indifference condition may be written as
Given this, I can now investigate whether hedging distortions will occur in the mark to market accounting regime. My first result is:
Proposition 2.
In a mark to market accounting regime, there is no pooling equilibrium.
Proof:
be the ex-ante expected utility of the existing shareholder of firm i , given that the derivatives position chosen by firm
i.e. it will choose to mimic firm H rather than choose its own optimum if by doing so it can increase the level of its shareholder's utility. Now: to be a pooling equilibrium, it must also be the case that firm H has no incentive to deviate i.e.
-in other words, given that firm L has chosenφ , firm H should mimic and also chooseφ since the value of its objective function by doing so is higher than the maximum value it can achieve by not mimicking.
. Then it is evident that firm H will wish to deviate since by doing so it can achieve its unconstrained maximum and so 
, the left hand reduces to
where the first inequality again that follows from my assumption that
Hence, in the mark to market accounting regime, there is no pooling equilibrium i.e. any equilibrium will be separating. In other words, in all cases the benefits to firm L from being pooled with firm H at 1 = t are outweighed by the adverse effect of the increased variance of its terminal cash flow.
The final question I need to address is whether these equilibria induce any hedging distortions. In this regard, consider the following two propositions: 
Discussion
In the above analysis, I have shown that hedging distortions do not occur under a mark to market hedge or deferral hedge accounting regime but may occur under a mark to market regime. It would therefore seem that regulators such as the FASB should favor either variety of hedge accounting if they wish to ensure that the accounting regime does not distort the economic activity that it is designed to report. However, I would argue that this is somewhat of an oversimplification.
To see this, let me first consider under what conditions hedge accounting is a feasible alternative.
Recall that the non-distortionary nature of such a regime is critically dependent upon the assumption that firm H either reports separately the two components of its operating earnings or discloses the fact that it has deferred its derivatives gain or loss -by doing so, investors are able to distinguish it from firm L in the event that L H φ φ = . If operating earnings or the deferral of the hedge gain or loss are not disclosed in this way, investors are (informationally) in exactly the same position as in the mark to market regime and distortions may occur. Let me now make the seemingly plausible assumption that the FASB requires disclosure only of information which is ex post verifiable; further, firms are also at liberty to make voluntarily any non-mandated disclosure which is similarly verifiable. However, the FASB will neither require nor permit disclosures which are ex post unverifiable -and penalizes such disclosures to an extent that firms will never have the incentive to make them. Similar penalties also apply in respect of disclosures which are ex post verifiable but untruthful. This is arguably rather a strong assumption but in some sense is nothing more than an extension of the FASB's desire for financial statement amounts to be "reliable".
Given this assumption, it would seem reasonable to claim that hedge accounting is feasible only if the systematic risk exposure of firm H can be verified ex post. This would be the case, for example, if this exposure related to sales denominated in a foreign currency; ex post, the level of these sales can be measured without error and it is easily checked whether or not a position in the forward contract was initiated as a hedge against these sales. Suppose that the FASB mandated mark to market accounting as the required regime. In this case, firm H could simply voluntarily disclose that the derivatives position it holds was taken out as a hedge; given the assumption above, investors will know that this disclosure is reliable and will therefore be able to perfectly distinguish the two firms. Informationally, therefore, the mark to market regime together with the ability to make voluntary disclosures regarding underlying exposures is equivalent to either variety of hedge accounting and any hedging distortions are eliminated.
Suppose however that systematic risk exposure of firm H is ex post nonverifiable. Now, deferral hedge accounting and mark to market hedge accounting (at least with separate disclosure of the components of operating earnings) are simply not realistic options. Consequently, either mark to market hedge accounting (with operating earnings reported only in total) or mark to market accounting are the only viable alternatives and distortions may occur.
Hence, it is less the actual regime and more the information available to investors which is crucial to determining whether or not distortions occur. Further, the information which can be made available is highly dependent upon the nature (in particular, the ex post verifiability) of any hedgeable risk exposure.
Summary and Conclusions
In this paper, I discuss the recent heated debate concerning how non-financial corporations should report the results of their use of derivative financial instruments. Using the recently issued SFAS 133 as a framework, I introduce three possible accounting regimes (mark to market hedge, deferral hedge and mark to market) and described the information provided to investors in financial statements under each of the three alternatives. I then introduce a simple economic model with which to analyze both the motivation for hedging and how this motivation might be affected by the financial reporting environment and showed that hedge distortions may occur under a mark to market regime but not under a mark to market hedge or deferral hedge regime. Finally, I discuss how these results were essentially driven by a single factor, namely whether or not the existence or otherwise of a hedgeable risk exposure was ex post verifiable.
The bottom line is as follows. Given the ex post verifiability of this risk exposure, the accounting regime chosen is essentially irrelevant provided that firms are allowed to make voluntary disclosures -in this case, hedging distortions will not occur. Under the alternative scenario, only mark to market hedge accounting (with operating earnings reported only in total) or mark to market accounting are viable alternatives and distortions may occur. However, this conclusion depends crucially on the assumption that voluntary disclosures by management form part of the information set that investors use. The question as to whether investors do indeed behave in this way is essentially an empirical one. Given that SFAS 133 will require firms to include "on balance sheet" items which are currently disclosed but are "off balance sheet", the introduction of the standard effectively presents an opportunity to directly examine this very question -this is an item for future research.
